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THE NETHERLANDS V URGENDA FOUNDATION: LESSONS FOR 
USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN CANADA TO 






I. INTRODUCTION: URGENDA AND GLOBAL ACTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
In a decision hailed as the “‘Strongest’ Climate Ruling Yet,”1 on December 20, 
2019, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld the first court order for a government to 
address the threat of climate change by reducing its greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions by a specified level within a specified time frame.2 If its reasoning 
proves persuasive, the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision in the appeal of The 
State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) v 
Urgenda Foundation3 could offer lessons for litigants in other jurisdictions—
including Canada. 
 
* Karinne Lantz is a doctoral student at the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University.  
This case digest draws on research supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council.  
 
1 John Schwartz, “In ‘Strongest’ Climate Ruling Yet, Dutch Court Orders Leaders to Take 
Action”, The New York Times (20 December 2019), online: 
<www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/climate/netherlands-climate-lawsuit.html> [perma.cc/3UQ2-
GE6K]. 
2 Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (High Council of the Netherlands), 20 December 2019, 
Urgenda Foundation v The Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy), 
ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, online: de Rechtspraak 
<uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI%3ANL%3AHR%3A2019%3A2007&fb
clid=IwAR1DQ7g-JAD38BAwQH29tEwfdpN1VxYBoMrWuE81vCvZx6EQuj4uJJVpcOw> 
[perma.cc/NNC8-G9XM] (unofficial English translation) [Urgenda], aff’g Gerechtshof Den 
Haag (Hague Court of Appeal), 9 October 2018, Urgenda Foundation v The Netherlands 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy), ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610, online: 
<uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610> (unofficial 
English translation) [perma.cc/NDY2-CN92] [Urgenda CA]. 
3 Urgenda, supra note 2. 
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This case digest focuses on the Canadian implications of Urgenda—
particularly with respect to current attempts to use human rights arguments to 
require more ambitious and immediate efforts to reduce Canadian GHG 
emissions. Although the Canadian Arctic (and Indigenous communities residing 
there) are particularly vulnerable to the threats posed by global climate change,4 
there has not yet been a court decision addressing Canada’s continuing failure 
to meet its successive GHG emissions targets. With pending climate litigation 
invoking a human rights approach, it is only a matter of time before Canadian 
courts will be faced with deciding, among other things, whether the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires governments in Canada to take more 
substantial and immediate action on climate change.5 In addition to raising 
issues like the scope of human rights obligations in the environmental context 
(including the scope of the right to life and equality rights), these claims will 
require Canadian courts to explore issues such as the separation of powers 
between the judicial, and the legislative and executive branches of government 
and whether the global nature of the threat of climate change allows individual 
countries like Canada—which are failing to do their part to reduce GHG 
emissions—to avoid being ordered to do more. 
Billed by the United Nations Secretary-General as the “defining issue of 
our time,”6 the risk of climate change has been recognized internationally for 
decades. In 1988, it spurred the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”), a body of the United Nations with a mandate “to 
provide policymakers with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate 
change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation.”7 
In 1992, after years of negotiation informed by the work of the IPCC, an 
 
4 See e.g. Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Climate change in Indigenous and 
Northern communities” (2 April 2019), online: Government of Canada <www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100034249/1100100034253> [perma.cc/78RY-4PQT]. 
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
6 António Guterres, “Remarks at High Level Event on Climate Change” (26 September 2018), 
online: United Nations Secretary-General <www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-09-
26/remarks-high-level-event-climate-change> [perma.cc/NKT3-XBX3]. 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “What is the IPCC?” (30 August 2013) at 1, 
online (pdf): IPCC <www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/FS_what_ipcc.pdf> 
[perma.cc/97XX-AMDZ]. 
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international treaty entitled the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) was concluded.8 The UNFCCC’s “ultimate 
objective” is “to achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”9 Among other things, an initial GHG 
emissions reduction target was identified10 for countries listed in Annex I11 of 
the UNFCCC;  however, the Convention did not impose binding GHG 
emissions targets on states parties or contain an enforcement mechanism.12 As 
a framework convention, the principles contained within the UNFCCC have 
helped to guide the development of additional treaties aimed at achieving its 
objective. More specific, legally-binding GHG emission reduction targets for 
2008 to 2012 were established under the Kyoto Protocol of 2005 for developed 
countries listed in Annex I of the Protocol.13 However, despite these 
commitments and the ground-breaking nature of the Kyoto Protocol, it failed to 
lead to a significant reduction in global GHG emissions. 
 In 2015, the Paris Agreement was concluded under the UNFCCC.14  
The Agreement seeks to assist with implementing and achieving the objective 
of the UNFCCC and requires states parties “to undertake … ambitious efforts”15 
 
8 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 170 
(entered into force 21 March 1994) [UNFCCC]. 
9 Ibid, art 2. 
10 Ibid, art 4(2)(b). 
11 See ibid (Annex I countries are those that are members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [excluding Mexico and South Korea] and 12 other countries 
with economies in transition, Annex I). 
12 See The Berlin Mandate: Review of the adequacy of Article 4, subparagraph 2(a) and (b), 
of the Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and decisions on follow-up, 
FCCC Dec 1/CP.1, UNFCCC COP, 1st Session, 1995, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (at 
the first conference of the parties, it was recognized, among other things, in the Berlin 
Mandate that the target of limiting Annex I countries’ GHG emissions to 1990 levels was “not 
adequate” at 4). 
13 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 
December 1997, 2303 UNTS 162 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [Kyoto Protocol]. 
Facing exceeding its Kyoto Protocol target significantly, Canada withdrew from the Protocol 
in 2012. 
14 Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, CTS 2016/9, art 3 (entered into force 4 November 
2016). 
15 Ibid.  
148 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues Vol. 41 
 
aimed at realizing the Agreement’s purpose of “strengthen[ing] the global 
response to the threat of climate change, in light of the context of sustainable 
development and efforts to eradicate poverty.”16 The Agreement requires all 
states parties to, among other things, set individual nationally determined 
contributions (“NDCs”) aimed at reducing GHG emissions and identifying 
measures to be taken to adapt to climate change.17 While the Agreement does 
not contain a binding legal requirement on countries to reduce their GHG 
emissions by a specific level, it imposes binding procedural obligations on states 
parties to “prepare, communicate and maintain” progressive NDCs, which must 
be registered with the UNFCCC secretariat.18 States parties must also report 
their efforts under their NDCs to the secretariat.19 
Despite being notable because they require a transparent commitment 
by states parties to reduce their GHG emissions, current NDCs are not sufficient 
for states parties to meet collectively the purpose of the UNFCCC.20  Even more 
concerning, many countries (including Canada) are not on track to meet the 
GHG emission targets included in the NDCs to which they have committed.21  
As UN Secretary-General Guterres has lamented, “[s]cientists have been telling 
us for decades [about the risk of climate change]. Over and over again. Far too 
many leaders have refused to listen.”22 Backed by the now virtually indisputable 
threat of climate change and the role that GHG emissions play in contributing 
to climate change, domestic court decisions following the lead of Urgenda could 
force leaders to not only listen, but to take more meaningful—and timely—
action to mitigate the threats posed by climate change. 
 
16 Ibid, art 2. 
17 Ibid, art 3. 
18 Ibid, art 4. 
19 Ibid. 
20 United Nations Environment Programme, “Emissions Gap Report 2019” (November 2019) 
at xiii, 25, online (pdf): UNEP 
<wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30797/EGR2019.pdf> [perma.cc/6CWP-
V253] [“Emissions Gap Report 2019”]. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Somini Sengupta, “U.N. Chief Warns of Dangerous Tipping Point on Climate Change”, 
New York Times (10 September 2018), online: 
<www.nytimes.com/2018/09/10/climate/united-nations-climate-change.html> 
[perma.cc/2C9C-8QCB]. 
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II. THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS (MINISTRY OF 
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND CLIMATE POLICY) V URGENDA 
FOUNDATION 
 
While the Netherlands had previously adopted a GHG emissions reduction 
target of 30% from 1990 levels by the end of 2020 because it then considered a 
reduction of 25 to 40% to be necessary to reach the goal of containing global 
warming to 2°C, in 2011 this target was lowered to 20%.23  In 2013, the Dutch 
non-governmental organization Urgenda (a portmanteau of “Urgent Agenda”) 
filed a lawsuit on behalf of residents in the Netherlands seeking an order for the 
Netherlands to reduce, by the end of 2020, its GHG emissions by 25 to 40% 
from 1990 levels. Urgenda advanced several causes of action to support its 
claim, including that the Netherlands had failed to meet its duty of care owed 
to—and had violated the human rights of—its residents. During the course of 
the litigation, the Netherlands did not dispute the risk that GHG emissions and 
resulting climate change pose.   
In 2015, while it rejected Urgenda’s human rights claims, the Hague 
District Court decided in favour of Urgenda on the basis of negligence and 
ordered the Netherlands to reduce its emissions by at least 25% by the end of 
2020.24 In 2018, the Hague Court of Appeal upheld the order of the Hague 
District Court; however, in doing so, it allowed Urgenda’s cross-appeal 
 
23 See Urgenda, supra note 2 at paras 7.4.1–7.4.2. 
24 Rechtbank Den Haag (Court of the Hague), 24 June 2015, Urgenda Foundation v The 
Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy), ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:714 
at paras 4.53–4.93. For a discussion of the lower court decisions in Urgenda, supra note 2, see 
e.g. Jolene Lin, “The First Successful Climate Negligence Case: A Comment on Urgenda 
Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment)”, 
Note, (2015) 5:1 Climate L 65; Josephine van Zeben, “Establishing a Governmental Duty of 
Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?” (2015) 4:2 Transnational 
Environmental L 339; Suryapramit Roy, “Situating Urgenda v the Netherlands within 
Comparative Climate Change Litigation” (2016) 34:2 J Energy & Natural Resources L 165; 
Benoit Mayer, “The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation: Ruling of the Court of 
Appeal of the Hague”, Case Note, (2018) 8:1 Transnational Environmental L 167; Jacqueline 
Peel & Hari M Osofsky, “A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?” (2018) 7:1 
Transnational Environmental L 37. 
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asserting that its claim could succeed based on the Netherlands’ human rights 
obligations.25 
The case was appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court. At the Supreme 
Court, the Netherlands argued that Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (commonly 
known as the “European Convention on Human Rights”)26—which respectively 
protect the right to life and the right to private and family life—“do not imply 
an obligation for [the] State to take mitigating or other measures to counter 
climate change.”27  It also argued that the order was “impermissible” because it 
would effectively “create legislation and would contravene the political freedom 
accruing to the government and parliament and, thus, the system of separation 
of powers.”28 The Netherlands’ Procurator General advised that the appeal 
should be rejected29 and, ultimately, the Supreme Court did just that: it 
dismissed the appeal and upheld the Hague Court of Appeal’s order that the 
Netherlands’ human rights obligations require it to reduce its GHG emissions 
by at least 25% by the end of 2020.  
 
a. Climate change as a “real and immediate” threat to human rights 
 
Whether human activities and the release of GHG contribute to climate change 
was not disputed in Urgenda. Similarly, the Netherlands agreed that an 
international consensus exists that dire consequences will follow if the Earth 
warms by more than 2°C (and possibly even 1.5°C) from “pre-industrial 
levels”30 and that there may be a “tipping point … result[ing] in abrupt climate 
change, for which neither mankind nor nature can properly prepare.”31 In light 
 
25 Urgenda CA, supra note 2 at paras 35–45. 
26 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 
1950, 213 UNTS 221, art 2 (entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR]. 
27 Urgenda, supra note 2 at para 2.2.3. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Procurator General of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, “Conclusie” (13 September 
2019) online: de Rechtspraak 
<uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:1026> [perma.cc/XZM5-
8JXK] (unofficial English translation). 
30 See Urgenda, supra note 2 at paras 2.1, 4.2. 
31 Ibid at para 2.1. 
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of the consensus regarding the threat of “dangerous climate change”32 and the 
need to act,33 in the Supreme Court’s view, the Hague Court of Appeal was 
correct to find that climate change posed a threat to the residents of the 
Netherlands capable of supporting violations of Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR.34 
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the Netherlands that the threat 
was not sufficiently specific to violate Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR and that a 
global threat like climate change is not covered by the Convention.35 
Relying on jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”), the Supreme Court reasoned that the obligation to respect the right 
to life under Article 2 of the ECHR requires the Netherlands to take suitable 
measures to address threats to the right to life, even when the threat derives from 
environmental hazards that materialize over the long term.36 This is because 
Article 2 imposes a “positive obligation to take appropriate steps to safeguard 
the lives of those within [the state’s] jurisdiction”37 and because the state must 
“take appropriate steps if there is a real and immediate risk to persons and the 
state in question is aware of that risk.”38  As the Supreme Court explained, to be 
considered “real and immediate”, the risk must be “both genuine and 
imminent.”39 It further reasoned that “immediate” should be understood not as 
requiring “that the risk must materialise within a short period of time,”  but 
rather that “the risk in question is directly threatening the persons involved.”40 
The Supreme Court found that Article 8 applies in a similar manner as 
Article 2, with caselaw from the ECtHR having established that, “when it comes 
 
32 Ibid at para 4.3. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid (“the Court of Appeal concluded, quite understandably … that there was ‘a real threat 
of dangerous climate change, resulting in the serious risk that the current generation of citizens 
will be confronted with loss of life and/or a disruption of family life’. The Court of Appeal 
also held … that it was ‘clearly plausible that the current generation of Dutch nationals, in 
particular but not limited to the younger individuals in this group, will have to deal with the 
adverse effects of climate change in their lifetime if global emissions of greenhouse gases are 
not adequately reduced’” at para 4.7). 
35 Ibid at para 5.1. 
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to environmental issues, Article 8 … encompasses the positive obligation to 
take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect individuals against possible 
serious damage to their environment.”41 It explained that, “[t]he obligation to 
take measures exists if there is a risk that serious environmental contamination 
may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes 
in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely. That risk need 
not exist in the short term.”42 The Supreme Court noted that the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR had established that positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 
overlap: “In the case of environmentally hazardous activities, the state is 
expected to take the same measures pursuant to Article 8 … that it would have 
to take pursuant to Article 2.”43 
Invoking the precautionary principle,44 the Supreme Court held that the 
obligations on the Netherlands under Articles 2 and 8 arise “even if the 
materialisation of … danger is uncertain.”45 As it explained, “[i]f it is clear that 
the real and immediate risk [of dangerous climate change] … exists, states are 
obliged to take appropriates steps without having a margin of appreciation.”46 
While it noted that “states … have discretion in choosing the steps to be taken,” 
such steps “must actually be reasonable and suitable” in light of the 
“circumstances of that case.”47 Courts can review actions taken by the state to 
assess whether they are reasonable and suitable,48 although, in doing so, they 
must keep in mind that “Articles 2 and 8 … must not result in an impossible 
or… disproportionate burden being imposed on a state.”49 
 
41 Ibid at para 5.2.3. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid at para 5.2.4. 
44 In international environmental law, the precautionary principle provides that scientific 
uncertainty regarding the potential for harm does not justify refusing to take action to prevent 
or mitigate harm. See e.g. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I), 31 
ILM 874 (14 June 1992) (“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation”, principle 15). 
45 Urgenda, supra note 2 at para 5.3.2. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid at para 5.3.3. 
49 Ibid at para 5.3.4. 
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The Court highlighted that it is bound by the Dutch constitution to 
“apply every provision of the ECHR that is binding on all persons” and that it 
must interpret the ECHR in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.50 
Extending the ECtHR’s jurisprudence to climate change, it found that “no other 
conclusion can be drawn but that the State is required pursuant to Articles 2 and 
8 … to take measures to counter the genuine threat of dangerous climate change 
if this were merely a national problem”51 because it is clear that there is a “real 
and immediate risk” and “that the lives and welfare of Dutch residents could be 
seriously jeopardised.”52 In light of the precautionary principle, it held that 
“[t]he mere existence of a sufficiently genuine possibility that this risk will 
materialise means that suitable measures must be taken.”53 
 
b. Shared and Individual Responsibility to Act 
 
As the Supreme Court summarized, the Netherlands had argued that it was not 
obliged to do more than reduce its GHG emissions beyond 20% from 1990 
levels as it had previously committed.54  It supported this position on a number 
of grounds, including a form of the de minimis argument (discussed more fully 
below), as it asserted that “[t]he recommended extra reduction” in the country’s 
GHG emissions would “have no measurable effect on the global rise in 
temperature” and “[t]he Netherlands cannot solve the global climate problem 
on its own.”55 
These arguments proved unpersuasive. The Court found that the 
Netherlands has an obligation to “do ‘its part’ in order to prevent dangerous 
climate change,” despite climate change being a “global problem.”56 The Court 
supported this finding on the basis that, as recognized in the UNFCCC, “climate 
change is a global problem that needs to be solved globally”57 and “each state 
 
50 Ibid at para 5.6.1. 
51 Ibid at para 5.6.2. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid at para 5.6.3. 
54 Ibid at para 3.4. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid at para 5.7.1. 
57 Ibid at para 5.7.2. 
154 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues Vol. 41 
 
has an obligation to take the necessary measures in accordance with its specific 
responsibilities and possibilities.”58 Invoking the principle of international law 
that “countries must not cause each other harm,” the Court also held that, in the 
context of climate change and GHG emissions, “each country is responsible for 
its part and can therefore be called to account in that respect.”59 
The Supreme Court firmly rejected the argument that the Netherlands 
was relieved of its obligations because climate change is a global threat that the 
Netherlands alone cannot address.  It specifically rejected that (i) “a state does 
not have to take responsibility because other countries do not comply with their 
partial responsibility;” and, (ii) the Netherlands could not be held to account 
because its “own share in global greenhouse gas emissions is very small and … 
reducing emissions from [its] territory makes little difference on a global 
scale.”60 As the Court concluded, “acceptance of these defences would mean 
that a country could easily evade its partial responsibility by pointing out other 
countries[’] or its own small share” of GHG emissions on a global scale.61 In 
addition, the Court noted that “rul[ing] out” these defences increases the 
prospect for other countries taking meaningful action on climate change because 
it allows each country to “be effectively called to account for its share of 
emissions” and maximizes the potential for “all countries actually making their 
contribution.”62 
 
c. 25% by 2020 as a Minimum Individual Emissions Reduction Target 
 
Having found that the Netherlands was obliged under the ECHR “to take 
adequate measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from Dutch territory,”63 
the Court considered whether the Netherlands was taking adequate measures—
and concluded it was not. It held that there was an obligation on the Netherlands 
to reduce its emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020. This finding was not 
 
58 Ibid at para 5.7.3. 
59 Ibid at para 5.7.5. 
60 Ibid at para 5.7.7. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid at para 6.1.  
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based on the fact that there is an unequivocally clear international obligation on 
countries to meet this target (currently, there is not), but, rather, because “there 
is a high degree of international consensus on the urgent need for [UNFCCC] 
Annex I countries to reduce greenhouse emissions by at least 25–40% by 2020 
compared to 1990 levels, in order to achieve at least the two-degree target.”64 In 
the Court’s view, this target “must be taken into account when interpreting and 
applying the ECHR.”65 
The Netherlands argued that the 25–40% target applied to Annex I 
countries as a group and not on the Netherlands individually; however, the Court 
concluded that it applied specifically to the Netherlands. In its view, the 
Netherlands failed to establish “why a lower percentage should apply” to it as 
an Annex I country—particularly in light of the fact that “the Netherlands is one 
of the countries [in Annex I] with very high per capita emissions of greenhouse 
gases.”66 
Significantly, the Court seized on the necessity of acting now, rather 
than accepting that the Netherlands could meet its obligation by taking less 
substantive measures in the short-term with the promise of more aggressive 
action in the future. On this point, the Court rejected the Netherlands’ arguments 
that its 20% reduction target was sufficient because it would meet its obligations 
through future mitigation67 and adaptation efforts (or, as the Court phrased it, 
“whereby measures are postponed for a prolonged period of time”68). Since 
postponing emissions reductions increases the risk of dangerous climate change 
due to the cumulative effects of GHGs,69 the Supreme Court held that the Hague 
Court of Appeal had not erred when it concluded that the Netherlands “has 
insufficiently substantiated that it would be possible for a responsible policy to 
 
64 Ibid at para 7.2.11.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid at para 7.3.4. 
67 Ibid at para 7.4.2. 
68 Ibid at para 8.3.4. 
69 Ibid (“[a]ny postponement of the reduction of emissions therefore means that emissions in 
the future will have to be reduced on an increasingly large scale in order to make up for the 
postponement in terms of both of time and size. This means that, in principle, for each 
postponement of emissions reductions, the reduction measures to be taken at a later date will 
have to be increasingly far-reaching and costly in order to achieve the intended result, and it 
will also be riskier” at para 7.4.3).  
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prevent dangerous climate change to include a greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction target of less than at least 25% by 2020.”70  As the Supreme Court 
forcefully noted, to be reasonable, a target of reducing GHG emissions by 25% 
by the end of 2020 is “an absolute minimum.”71 
The Court was also not satisfied by the Netherlands’ promise of future 
adaptation measures: “although it is correct that the consequences of climate 
change can be mitigated by taking adaptation measures, it has not been 
demonstrated or made plausible that the potentially disastrous consequences of 
excessive global warming can be adequately prevented by such measures.”72 
Finally, the Netherlands did not establish that meeting the 25% reduction target 
would result in an impossible or disproportionate burden on it. In the Court’s 
view, it was significant that the Netherlands had previously adopted a target of 
30% and “other EU countries pursue much stricter climate policies” than the 
Netherlands.73 
 
d. Political Discretion and Climate Change Action 
 
Having concluded that the ECHR obliges the Netherlands to do its part to 
combat the threat posed by dangerous climate change and reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020, the Supreme Court considered 
whether such an order was “impermissible” because it (i) amounted to creating 
legislation, and (ii) was a political decision outside of the authority of the Dutch 
courts.74 The Netherlands’ arguments on both points were unsuccessful. First, 
the Court concluded that “this order does not amount to an order to take specific 
legislative measures” because it “leaves the State free to choose the measures to 
be taken in order to achieve a 25% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 
2020” and “it remains for the State to determine what measures will be taken 
and what legislation will be enacted to achieve that reduction.”75 
 
70 Ibid at para 7.5.1. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid at para 7.5.2. 
73 Ibid at para 7.5.3. 
74 Ibid at para 8.1. 
75 Ibid at para 8.2.7. 
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Second, the Court similarly concluded that ordering the Netherlands to 
reduce its GHG emissions would not result in the judiciary impermissibly 
wading into the political arena. As the Court recognized, the Dutch government 
and parliament enjoy “a large degree of discretion to make the political 
considerations that are necessary” to address climate change; however, the 
exercise of this discretion is subject to judicial review.76 Accordingly, it “is up 
to the courts to decide whether, in availing themselves of this discretion, the 
government and parliament have remained within the limits of the law by which 
they are bound.”77 Critically, these legal limits include those “arising from the 
ECHR.”78 As the Supreme Court reiterated, “Dutch courts are obliged under … 
the Dutch Constitution to apply [the ECHR’s] provisions in accordance with the 
interpretation of the ECtHR” and “[t]he protection of human rights [this] 
provides is an essential component of a democratic state under the rule of law.”79 
Ultimately, one may arguably see the Court’s recognition of the 
importance of maintaining an appropriate balance between the judicial and 
legislative branches of government in its underscoring of the “exceptional” 
nature of this case in its summary of its reasoning: 
 
This case involves an exceptional situation. After all, there is the threat 
of dangerous climate change and it is clear that measures are urgently 
needed. … The State is obliged to do ‘its part’ in this context. … 
Towards the residents of the Netherlands … that duty follows from 
Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, on the basis of which the State is obliged to 
protect the right to life and the right to private and family life of its 
residents. … The fact that Annex I countries, including the 
Netherlands, will need to reduce their emissions by at least 25% by 
2020 follows from the view generally held in climate science and in 
the international community. … The policy that the State pursues since 
2011 and intends to pursue in the future … whereby measures are 




76 Ibid at para 8.3.2. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid at para 8.3.3. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid at para 8.3.4. 
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III. URGENDA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR CANADIAN 
CLIMATE LITIGATION 
 
There are at least three pending cases in Canada seeking orders for Canadian 
governments to do more to reduce GHG emissions based on the risk that 
insufficient climate action poses to human rights: ENvironnement JEUnesse v 
Canada (Attorney General), Mathur v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of 
Ontario, and La Rose v Canada.81 The Superior Court of Quebec denied 
certification of ENvironnement JEUnesse as a class action; however, this 
decision is being appealed.82 Notably, in denying certification, the Court 
recognized that climate claims based on the Charter and the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms may be justiciable.83 Canada submitted its 
statement of defence in La Rose in February 2020; some of its arguments reflect 
those made by the Netherlands in Urgenda, as it acknowledges the risk posed 
by climate change but maintains that its climate change policy is not 
 
81 ENvironnement JEUnesse c Procureur général du Canada (2018), 500-06-000955-183 (Qc 
Sup Ct) (Motion for Authorization), online (pdf): Sabin Center for Climate Change Law: 
Columbia University <blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2018/20181126_500-06-000955-
183_application-2.pdf> [perma.cc/DC76-3SAQ] (unofficial English translation); Mathur v 
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (2019), CV-19-00631627 (Ont Sup Ct J) (Notice 
of Application), online (pdf): Sabin Center for Climate Change Law: Columbia University 
<blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-
casedocuments/ 2019/20191125_CV-19-00631627_complaint.pdf> [perma.cc/SN9N-
9L6Z]; La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen (2019), T-1750-19 (FC) (Statement of Claim), 
online (pdf): Sabin Center for Climate Change Law: Columbia University 
<blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-
casedocuments/2019/20191025_T-1750-19_complaint.pdf> [perma.cc/DWU5-XCNF].  Past 
attempts not based on human rights that sought to hold Canada to its GHG commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol using its implementing legislation and challenging Canada’s 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol failed: See Friends of the Earth v Canada (Governor in 
Council), 2008 FC 1183, aff’d 2009 FCA 297; Turp v Canada (Justice), 2012 FC 893. 
82 ENvironnement JEUnesse c Procureur général du Canada, 2019 QCCS 2885, online (pdf): 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law: Columbia University 
<blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2019/20190711_500-06-000955-183_decision-2.pdf> [perma.cc/M6UJ-BTPX] 
(unofficial English translation). 
83 Ibid at paras 46–78. 
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reviewable.84 (The Statement of Defence also describes in detail the actions that 
the Government of Canada has taken, and plans to take, to address the threat of 
climate change, from which one may infer that it is prepared to defend its 
policies as reasonable should the court conclude that the matter is justiciable.85) 
At the time of publication, Ontario had not filed its defence in Mathur. 
 While it is beyond the scope of this case digest to assess how these cases 
are likely to be decided, there are a number of reasons why Urgenda may be 
significant in Canadian climate litigation.86  First, Urgenda may offer lessons 
for Canadian litigants because, like the pending Canadian cases, it involved a 
 
84 La Rose v Her Majesty the Queen (2019), T-1750-19 (FC) (Statement of Defence), online 
(pdf): Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia University 
<blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2020/20200207_T-1750-19_reply.pdf> [perma.cc/36F2-NEAP] [La Rose 
(Statement of Defence)] (“climate change is real, measurable, and documented. It is not a 
distant problem, but one that is happening now and that is having very real consequences on 
people’s lives. Its impacts will get more significant over time” at para 3; “Notwithstanding its 
global nature, climate change is having a particularly significant impact in Canada … Changes 
in climate are increasingly affecting Canada’s natural environment, economic sectors and the 
health of Canadians, and climate change is increasingly exacerbating the impacts of other 
stressors on natural ecosystems in Canada and on the well-being of Canadians” at para 19; 
“While climate change is a global phenomenon, it has significant and particular impacts on 
Canada and Canadians” at para 22; “Addressing climate change is the shared responsibility of 
a multitude of different actors” at para 104; “Only the executive and legislative branches of 
government may make policy, pass laws and authorize the allocation of public funds” at para 
105; “The Plaintiffs’ claims fall well outside the realm of permissible review by the courts. 
The claim does not target any particular law or its application. Rather, in essence, the claim 
asks the courts to decide whether the executive is governing well and to mandate that 
Parliament exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner. Ultimately, these matters are not 
justiciable, nor do they give rise to any valid causes of action either under the Constitution or 
pursuant to common law” at para 7). 
85 Ibid at paras 36–44, 54–100. 
86 For a detailed analysis of legal issues arising in human rights based Canadian climate 
litigation, see e.g., Nathalie J Chalifour & Jessica Earle, “Feeling the Heat: Climate Litigation 
under the Canadian Charter’s Right to life, Liberty, and Security of the Person” (2018) 42:4 Vt 
L Rev 689. It should be noted that courts considering ENvironnement JEUnesse, La Rose, and 
Mathur on their merits will be faced with an additional issue not addressed in Urgenda; 
namely, whether inadequate action on climate change infringes the equality rights younger 
generations since young people face a disproportionate burden of the negative effects of the 
government failing to take reasonable steps to address climate change. Such 
“intergenerational” climate change cases are pending before the courts in a number of 
countries; see e.g. Juliana v The United States, 217 F.Supp.3d, 1224, 83 ERC 1598 (US Dist 
Ct, Dist Or 2016). 
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claim based, in part, on the right to life. Second, the Dutch Supreme Court 
considered a number of defences likely to be raised in Canadian cases, including 
that it is impermissible for courts to review climate change policies and the de 
minimis contribution to climate change argument. 
An issue to note at the outset is that the way in which Canadian courts 
approach the right to life issue may be different than the Dutch courts due to 
how international law is received in the Canadian legal system. As noted in 
Urgenda, the ECHR applies directly in the Netherlands and Dutch courts are 
bound to apply the (relatively rich and progressive) jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR.87 As such, Urgenda was able to base its claims on the ECHR. In contrast 
to the Netherlands, although Canada is party to a number of international treaties 
obliging it to respect international human rights within its jurisdiction (including 
the right to life88), Canadian claims need to be based on domestic law—most 
obviously, the Charter. This is because, in Canada, violations of international 
treaty obligations do not provide a domestic cause of action unless the treaty 
obligation in question has been implemented into Canadian law, which is 
generally achieved by passing implementing legislation.89 International human 
rights law may nevertheless remain significant in Canadian climate change 
litigation because the Charter may be viewed as implicitly implementing some 
of Canada’s treaty-based international human rights obligations.90 The Supreme 
Court of Canada has also recognized repeatedly that the Charter should be 
interpreted so that it provides at least as much protection as binding relevant 
international human rights law.91 
In addition, although it has no binding precedential effect in Canada, 
jurisprudence from bodies like the ECtHR may influence the interpretation of 
 
87 Urgenda, supra note 2 at paras 5.6.1, 8.3.3. 
88 See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171, art 6 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976). 
89 See e.g. Gib van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, 2nd ed (Irwin Law: 
Toronto, 2008), ch 7; John H Currie, Public International Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2008) at 235. 
90 See e.g. R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 169 DLR (4th) 193 (“[o]ur Charter is the 
primary vehicle through which international human rights achieve a domestic effect” at para 
73); van Ert, supra note 89 at 333–35. 
91 See e.g. Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, [1989] SCJ No 45 
(QL) at para 23; R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at para 55. 
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the Charter because non-binding international human rights law may be 
considered “relevant and persuasive” by Canadian courts when they are 
interpreting analogous Canadian law.92 It is worth highlighting how 
international human rights law can affect the interpretation of the Charter 
because it often goes unaddressed in Canadian litigation; it was initially not 
raised, for example, by the plaintiffs in ENvironnement JEUnesse, although the 
Quebec Court of Appeal has allowed Amnesty International Canada to 
intervene in order to present international law arguments in the upcoming 
appeal.93 How international human rights law affects the interpretation of the 
Charter could be an important matter. The potential for international human 
rights law to spur a more expansive interpretation of Charter rights will be 
particularly strong if cases like Urgenda represent a new or “emerging 
consensus”94 on how international human rights—such as the right to life—are 
interpreted in the climate change context. 
More specifically, Urgenda could influence how Canadian courts 
interpret the Charter, including whether climate change poses a recognizable 
risk to Charter rights and, if so, whether Canada is under a positive obligation 
to mitigate this risk. In Urgenda, the Dutch Supreme Court relied on ECtHR 
caselaw to find that climate change posed a sufficiently “real and immediate 
risk” for the purposes of the ECHR even when the risk “may only materialise in 
the longer term” and that the Netherlands is under a positive obligation to reduce 
its GHG emissions on account of the risk.95 In contrast, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has not yet recognized that section 7 of the Charter imposes positive 
obligations on the state to protect the right to life.96 In line with this reasoning, 
 
92 See e.g. Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR 313, 
1987 CanLII 88 at paras 57–60, Dickson CJ, dissenting; Saskatchewan Federation of Labour 
v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 at para 69 [SFL]. 
93 Amnistie internationale Canada c Environnement Jeunesse, 2020 QCCA 223 at paras 22–
27. 
94 See e.g. SFL, supra note 92 at paras 69, 71–75: the majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada used, among other sources, non-binding international human rights law including 
jurisprudence from the ECtHR to support overturning its prior jurisprudence and recognize 
that freedom of association under section 2(b) of the Charter includes the right to strike. 
95 See Urgenda, supra note 2 at paras 5.2.2, 5.2.1–5.2.4. 
96 Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84 (“[s]ection 7 speaks of the right not to 
be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person, except in accordance with the principles 
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for section 7 to be violated, there must be a “real or imminent” deprivation of 
life, liberty, or security of the person in a manner inconsistent with the principles 
of fundamental justice.97 It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court of 
Canada would (i) recognize that Canada is under a positive obligation to reduce 
its GHG emissions to avoid infringing section 7, and (ii) adopt an arguably 
expansive notion of “a real and immediate risk” in line with the reasoning in 
Urgenda and the caselaw of the ECtHR. Given, however, that the Supreme 
Court of Canada has asserted that the Charter ought to be interpreted in a way 
that provides at least as much protection as binding international human rights 
law, this may provide an opening for Canadian climate litigation plaintiffs to 
persuade Canadian courts to follow the reasoning in Urgenda. With the UN 
Human Rights Committee recently finding that Canadian courts have too 
narrowly interpreted Canada’s right to life obligations under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by not recognizing positive obligations 
in the context of healthcare,98 it may only be a matter of time until the Supreme 
Court of Canada recognizes that, in certain circumstances, the right to life 
imposes positive obligations on the state. Given the shift necessary in the 
approach to the right to life under section 7 of the Charter, it may be difficult 
for current Canadian litigants to convince the judiciary that positive obligations 
exist in the climate change context; however, the underlying right-to-life 
argument will be strengthened for future cases if Urgenda marks the beginning 
of a trend in international human rights law of courts recognizing a broader 
 
of fundamental justice. Nothing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s. 7 places a 
positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or security of the 
person. Rather, s. 7 has been interpreted as restricting the state’s ability to deprive people of 
these. Such a deprivation does not exist in the case at bar. … One day s. 7 may be interpreted 
to include positive obligations. … It would be a mistake to regard s. 7 as frozen, or its content 
as having been exhaustively defined in previous cases” at paras 81–82); see also La Rose 
(Statement of Defence), supra note 84 (Canada has argued that section 7 “do[es] not impose 
positive obligations to legislate or mobilize public resources in any particular way” at para 
110). 
97 See Scott v Canada (AG), 2017 BCCA 422, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2018 CanLII 
80680 (SCC). 
98 Views adopted by the Committee under article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol concerning 
communication No. 2348/2014, HRC Dec 2348/2014, UNHRC, 2018, 
CCPR/C/123/D/2348/2014; contra Toussaint v Canada (AG), 2011 FCA 213; Toussaint v 
Canada (AG), 2010 FC 810. 
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understanding of the right to life such that it imposes an obligation on countries 
to take more meaningful and immediate action against the threat of climate 
change. 
Urgenda may also be significant because the Dutch Supreme Court 
addressed a number of arguments that will likely be made during the course of 
Canadian climate litigation and Canadian courts might consider its reasoning 
persuasive. One such argument is that action on climate change is, ultimately, a 
matter for the legislative and executive branches of government—and not the 
courts—to determine. Although this argument was firmly rejected in Urgenda, 
it remains to be seen how Canadian courts—which have tended to show a high 
degree of deference to the legislative and executive branches of government in 
the environmental context—will address this issue. It is possible that the 
Supreme Court of Canada could follow the lead of the Dutch Supreme Court 
and find that Canada has an obligation under the Charter to take reasonable 
action to address the threat of climate change. Like the Dutch Supreme Court, 
Canadian courts could be satisfied that, by assessing the reasonableness of 
Canadian climate policies without mandating the specific measures to be taken, 
they are providing appropriate deference because the legislative and executive 
branches would still have the authority (and responsibility) to determine 
precisely how to meet Canada’s climate change obligations.99 
Canadian climate litigation will also no doubt address the de minimis 
defence, by which the government may attempt to avoid a finding that its 
climate policies infringe Charter rights on the basis that since “Canada [or a 
province/territory, as the case may be] contributes only a small proportion of 
global GHG emissions … it is not responsible for resulting harm.”100 Canada 
has made a form of this argument in La Rose, as it has submitted that: 
 
99 Canada has committed to a target of reducing its GHG emissions by 30% from 2005 levels 
by 2030; whether this would be considered “reasonable” in the eyes of Canadian courts to 
address the threat posed by climate change remains to be seen, as does to what extent 
Canadian courts may prove willing to scrutinize the adequacy of efforts to meet this target; see 
Canada, “Canada’s 2017 Nationally Determined Contribution Submission to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” at 1, online (pdf): UNFCCC 
<www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Canada%20First/Canada%20First%
20NDC-Revised%20submission%202017-05-11.pdf> [perma.cc/7JUU-3VBG]. 
100 Chalifour & Earle, supra note 86 at 751. 
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[e]ven if governments in Canada were to adopt measures that would 
reduce their share of GHG emissions needed to limit global warming 
to 1.5 degrees Celsius, this would not, on its own, be sufficient to 
ensure a reduction of global warming. This is because the rate of 
warming is dependent on a myriad of external factors, which include 
the actions of foreign states and other actors involved in the global fight 
against climate change.101 
 
Underlying this argument is the irrefutable fact that, even if it aggressively 
reduces its GHG emissions, Canada alone is unable to mitigate the risks climate 
change poses to Canadians. Given the global nature of climate change (in terms 
of both cause and effect), there may be a strong argument that Canadian action 
on GHG emissions cannot mitigate the risks related to climate change. But, is it 
legally significant that what Canada does alone may ultimately have no 
demonstrable effect on climate change—and therefore on the Charter rights of 
Canadians—because Canada accounts for too small of a proportion of global 
emissions? 
Urgenda suggests that the answer to such a question could be “no”. As 
the Dutch Supreme Court reasoned, climate change is a global threat requiring 
concerted global action and, while there is a shared global responsibility to 
combat climate change, there necessarily must be a recognizable and 
enforceable individual responsibility on each country to do its part. Ultimately, 
the Dutch Supreme Court’s conclusion on this point was bolstered by the facts 
that the Netherlands emits a disproportionately large share of GHG emissions, 
it had adopted a less stringent GHG emissions reduction policy than other 
comparable countries, and it did not show that meeting a higher target would be 
an undue burden. If similar reasoning is employed by Canadian courts, statistics 
may be on the side of Canadian plaintiffs and applicants: Canada plays a more 
significant role in climate change than the Netherlands (by, for example, 
emitting more carbon dioxide on per capita and total bases102), it has committed 
 
101 La Rose (Statement of Defence), supra note 84 at para 113. 
102 In 2014, the most recent year for which the World Bank data is available, Canada emitted 
15.2 kt of carbon dioxide per capita and 537,193 kt of carbon dioxide in total, compared to 9.9 
kt per capita and 167,303 kt total for the Netherlands; see World Bank, “CO2 emissions 
(metric tons per capita)” (last visited 30 April 2020), online: CO2 emissions (metric tons per 
capita) <data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC> and World Bank, “CO2 
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to a lower emissions target than the Netherlands for 2030,103 it is not on track to 
meet its target,104 and Canada ought to be able to “reduce its GHG [emissions] 
without major economic repercussions.”105 In addition, as Chalifour and Earle 
have highlighted, “[a]lthough at 1.6%, Canada’s emissions as a proportion of 
global emissions might be argued to be relatively small and thus insignificant, 
Canada is still among the top ten global emitters of GHGs on an absolute basis, 




This case digest has only touched the surface of the ways in which Urgenda 
may be significant to Canadian climate litigation. What is clear is that Canadian 
courts—like many around the world—will soon be faced with deciding similar 
issues as the Dutch Supreme Court did in Urgenda, including: whether the right 
to life requires the government to take more meaningful and timely action on 
climate change; if it is appropriate from a separation of powers perspective for 
courts to review climate change policies; and whether the concept of an 
individual but shared global responsibility to address the threat posed by climate 
change renders the de minimis defence unpersuasive.  
How Canadian courts handle these issues remains to be determined; 
however, if Urgenda marks the beginning of a trend of domestic courts ordering 
governments to take more effective and timely action against the threat of 
 
emissions (kt)” (last visited 30 April 2020), online: CO2 emissions (kt) 
<data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT>. 
103 See Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, “Submission by Latvia and 
the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union and Its Member States” (6 March 
2015) online (pdf): UNFCC  
<www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Austria%20First/LV-03-06-
EU%20INDC.pdf> [perma.cc/CNQ8-34VX] (the Netherlands has committed to a 40% 
reduction by 2030 at Annex). 
104 “Emissions Gap Report 2019”, supra note 20 at 10–11, 15 (multiple studies have 
concluded that Canada is on track to miss its target by 15% or more). 
105 Chalifour & Earle, supra note 86 at 753, 762–63. 
106 Ibid at 752, citing Paul Boothe & Félix A Boudreault, “By the Numbers: Canadian GHG 
Emissions” (2016) at 4, online (pdf): Lawrence National Centre for Policy and Management 
<www.ivey.uwo.ca/cmsmedia/2112500/4462-ghg-emissions-report-v03f.pdf> 
[perma.cc/22BZ-NDFZ]. 
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climate change due to their human rights obligations, it may only be a matter of 
time until climate claims based on human rights prevail in Canada. At the very 
least, given its ground-breaking nature, in any assessment, Urgenda will likely 
be considered—which, as its legal counsel has asserted, is Urgenda’s hope: 
“These human rights, they’re not unique to the Netherlands … We think and 
expect that other lawyers and courts will be looking at this judgment for 































107 Schwartz, supra note 1. 
